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Book Review
Five Myths About Sprawl
Sprawl: A Compact History by Robert Bruegmann. Chicago, Ill.: University
of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp. 301. $27.50 (cloth).
Michael Lewyn∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, metropolitan America has been transformed by “sprawl”: low-density, automobile-oriented, (usually) suburban development.1 Many central cities have lost population,2 while their
suburbs have gained residents3 and jobs.4 Moreover, cities’ remaining residents are disproportionately poor: the average income of suburban households is nearly twice that of urban households,5 and the majority of
America’s poor now live in central cities.6 Typically, new suburban devel-
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1. See Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History 18 (2005) (describing sprawl
as “low-density, scattered, urban development”); Oliver Gillham: The Limitless
City 4 (2002) (listing a variety of deªnitions, many of which emphasize development
far from traditional regional cores as well as automobile-oriented nature of “sprawl”
development). Bruegmann’s deªnition also describes sprawl as “unplanned.” See
Bruegmann, supra at 18 (describing sprawl as development “without systematic
large-scale or regional public land-use planning”). But if development is essentially
sprawling in nature, it is sprawl regardless of whether or not it was “planned” by a
regional government, a local government, or a real estate developer. Thus, whether the
development is “planned” or “unplanned” is irrelevant to whether that development
constitutes “sprawl.”
2. See David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs 7, 14–20 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting that, of
America’s twelve largest cities in 1950, ten lost population in later decades; generally,
cities have gained population only by annexing suburbs). But see infra notes 50–52
and accompanying text (discussing recovery of some cities in 1990s).
3. See Mark Andrew Snider, Note, The Suburban Advantage: Are The Tax Beneªts of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 157, 163 n.43 (2005) (noting that, since 1970,
suburban population has grown by 40%).
4. See Roberta F. Mann, On The Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice,
24 Va. Tax Rev. 587, 607 (2005) (reporting that two-thirds of new jobs located in suburbs).
5. See Snider, supra note 3, at 163 (noting that average suburban household income in
1999 exceeded $76,000, while average urban income only reached $40,816).
6. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 132 (“[A]lmost 55 percent of the nation’s citizens living
in poverty dwelt in the inner city in 1998. In 1960, that number was less than one-third.”).
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opment has been highly automobile-dependent: the majority of suburban
jobs are not accessible through public transit.7
A wide variety of commentators8 assert that sprawl has a number of
social, political, and economic repercussions. In particular, critics of the
status quo assert that sprawl immobilizes Americans too young, old, or
poor to drive;9 increases trafªc congestion and pollution by increasing driving;10 makes Americans less healthy by discouraging walking;11 reduces
the supply of farmland and open space by consuming more land than
more compact development;12 and increases overall government spending, as governments spend money on roads and utilities for new suburbs
while urban infrastructure becomes underutilized.13
In Sprawl: A Compact History, Robert Bruegmann, an art historian, has
painted a superªcially convincing case for the status quo, asserting that
sprawl is “a natural result of afºuence that occurs in all urbanized societies.”14 Bruegmann’s book has generated glowing media publicity15 and
some favorable scholarly attention.16

7. See Mann, supra note 4, at 607.
8. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 74 (critics of sprawl include environmental groups,
urban mayors, historic preservation groups, transit advocates, and some urban planners and architects).
9. See, e.g., Andres Duany et al., Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the
Decline of the American Dream 116 (2001) (suggesting that the inability to walk
to most activities means that “a [suburban] child’s personal mobility extends no farther than the edge of [his or her] subdivision”); id. at 123 (stating that automobile dependency puts non-driving elderly “out of reach of their physical and social needs”);
see also Gillham, supra note 1, at 137 (describing hardships of carless urban poor in
their efforts to reach suburban jobs). Cf. Jeff Plungis & Nick Bunkley, Innovations May
Keep Seniors Safer on Road, Detroit News, Mar. 14, 2005, available at http://www.
detnews.com/2005/specialreport/0503/14/A01-116287.htm (“21 percent of Americans over 65 no longer drive. Within the non-driving population, 54 percent stay
home on any given day because they don’t have a viable transportation option.”).
10. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 93 (suggesting that, as a result of sprawl, roads are
“overwhelmed” and “the hours spent driving and stuck in trafªc arguably use increasing amounts of energy and generate more air pollution.”).
11. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 76 (suggesting that “increase in driving and the decrease in walking are also contributing to obesity and ill health.”).
12. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 75, 77.
13. Id. at 124–46, 142 (raising argument, but noting that evidence unclear).
14. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save The Cities, Stop The Suburbs?, 116 yale l.j. 598, 603 (2006)
(describing Bruegmann’s book). See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (positing
sprawl as a result of “the democratization of society . . . [as] citizens have obtained
the ability to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative of the wealthy
and powerful.”).
15. See, e.g., Vincent J. Cannato, The Way We Live Now, WKLY. Standard, Mar. 20, 2006,
at 33, available at 2006 WLNR 4965810 (lauding book as “eminently readable and rational”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Learning to Love Sprawl, Saturday Evening Post,
Mar. 1, 2006, at 90, available at 2006 WLNR 4261933 (stating book “makes a strong
case that a lot of the things we think we know about sprawl just ain’t so. I hope that
it gets the attention it deserves”); Kevin Nance, Learning to Sprawl: Think The Suburbs
Are Getting Too Crowded?, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 27, 2005, at 39, available at 2005 WLNR
20976009 (“[T]he early critical response to Bruegmann’s book has been mostly positive”).
16. See Garnett, supra note 14, at 609 (criticizing some of Bruegmann’s arguments, but
describing book as “a valuable addition to the voluminous land use literature—wellresearched, well-written, thought-provoking, and full of captivating history”).
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The purpose of this Review is to use Bruegmann’s defense of the status
quo as a launching point for a broader discussion of the sprawl issue. In
particular, this Review suggests that Bruegmann overestimates the universality of sprawl, by overlooking the differences between pedestrianfriendly cities with some sprawling development and cities in which automobile-dependent sprawl is the only choice available to most consumers.
In addition, Bruegmann understates the harmful social effects of sprawl,
especially the effect of automobile-dependent development upon nondrivers. Bruegmann also consistently underestimates the role of government spending and regulations in creating sprawl and, as a result, fails to
adequately discuss the possibility that sprawl can be reduced by limiting,
rather than increasing, the size and intrusiveness of government.
II. Five Pro-Sprawl Myths
Bruegmann’s book claims that:
1. Sprawl has been going on for centuries and is thus what most
people naturally desire in the absence of government coercion;17
2. Sprawl is thus the result of the free market at work, and any
seemingly pro-sprawl government policies were virtually irrelevant to the growth of automobile-dependent suburbia;18
3. Regardless of the origins of sprawl, the harmful side effects of
sprawl are overrated by critics of the status quo;19
4. Sprawl cannot be limited without government regulations that
artiªcially constrict the housing supply and thus raise housing
prices;20 and
5. The anti-sprawl movement is elitist.21
As will be shown below, each of these assertions is ºawed. In fact, the
status quo is: (1) not inevitable; (2) partly a result of government intervention in the economy; (3) has negative side effects ignored by Bruegmann;
(4) can be changed without making government more intrusive; and (5) is
opposed by Americans from a wide variety of backgrounds.
A. Myth One: The Status Quo Is Eternal
One of the most widely praised elements of Bruegmann’s book is his
use of ancient history and comparative data to justify the status quo.22

17. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (claiming sprawl is perhaps a “predictable result
of increasing wealth”); id. at 23–32 (describing pre-modern and nineteenth-century
“sprawl”); id. at 73–80 (describing trend toward sprawl in afºuent countries).
18. See id. at 101–07.
19. See id. at 138–50.
20. See id. at 169–219.
21. See infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (describing quotes scattered throughout book).
22. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 14, at 600 (“Bruegmann’s most important contribution is
to place the current debate . . . in historical perspective”); Cannato, supra note 15
(“Bruegmann also places the issue within the larger historical context. He attempts to
show that dispersal from high-density core areas to low-density outer areas is a phenomenon common not just to modern America, but also ancient Rome and 19thcentury England”); Reynolds, supra note 15 (“Rich people have always wanted to

84 g Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal g Vol. 23, 2007
Bruegmann tells a story of eternal sprawl, pointing out that aristocrats
have purchased country estates in civilizations as diverse as ancient Rome
and eighteenth-century London.23 He goes on to show that, in both Europe
and the United States, some central cities have declined while automobile
use has risen in recent decades.24 Based on these facts, Bruegmann concludes that sprawl is a “predictable result of increasing wealth”25 that has
given the middle class “the ability to exercise the choices that once were
the sole prerogative of the wealthy and powerful.”26 He thus suggests
that, if sprawl is what the middle class wants, any attempt to limit sprawl
or its effects is doomed.27
There is a grain of truth underlying Bruegmann’s version of history:
given the wide variety of consumer tastes, some people will always prefer
relatively scattered, low-density housing. Bruegmann’s story, however,
overlooks important differences of degree: every city may have some
sprawling development, but not every city is equally dominated by sprawl.
In the most “sprawl-bound” cities and metropolitan areas, most residents
are unable to get to jobs or shops without driving. Carless residents are
thus virtually helpless.28 For example, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma—a
city with over 500,000 residents29—buses do not operate at night or on
Sundays.30 Therefore, the 8.2% of households without cars31 are essentially
frozen out of jobs that require evening work and are not within walking
or bicycling distance. In cities planned around the automobile, streets are
often so wide and trafªc moves so fast that the basic human act of walking outdoors becomes dangerous.32 Many streets lack sidewalks and, as a

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

31.
32.

sprawl”); Nance, supra note 15 (“Overall, Bruegmann contends, sprawl is a natural,
historic, worldwide process of decentralization that’s been going on at least since ancient Rome and China, when the wealthy got away from the bustle and noise of city
centers by building homes in outlying areas.”).
See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 23–24.
Id. at 73–80.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11 (stating that remedies to sprawl have consistently been “ineffective and in
some cases have led to unintended consequences arguably worse than the initial
problem.”).
See infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text (showing statistics on number of
nondriving Americans; about one-third of all Americans, including 11.5% of adults,
have no drivers’ license, while 21% of senior citizens, about half of disabled, and majority of welfare recipients do not drive).
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006 (Erik C. Gopel & Vincent Spadafora
eds., 2006), at 480 (Oklahoma City had 528,042 residents in 2004).
See, e.g., General Information, Metro Transit, available at http://www.gometro.
org (showing that, in Oklahoma City, buses do not run on Sundays or after 7:30
p.m.); Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 Marq.
L. Rev. 301, 348–50 (2000) (citing other examples of inadequate transit service
throughout the United States).
Cf. Bikes at Work, The Carfree Census Database, available at http://www.bikesat
work.com/carfree/carfree-census-database.html. This site has a search engine that
allows one to rank cities by transit ridership and other commuting-related variables.
See Surface Transportation Policy Project, Mean Streets 2004, Executive Summary, available at http://www.transact.org/library/reports_html/ms2004/exec_sum.asp
(reporting that over 4000 American pedestrians per year killed by automobile trafªc,
and “the most dangerous places to walk are metropolitan areas marked by newer,
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result, pedestrians must share streets with cars.33 In such cities, automobile ownership is an “absolute necessity”34 for most residents. Bruegmann
treats sprawl as the democratization of the country squire lifestyle35—but
there is nothing democratic or egalitarian about a system that limits
transportation to those who can participate in the suburban car culture.
By contrast, residents of less sprawling regions have a variety of
transportation options. For example, the majority of New York City residents get to work via public transit (as opposed to 1% of Oklahoma City
residents),36 and the city has prosperous neighborhoods where most households do not even own cars.37 In metropolitan New York, transportation
choice is not limited to city residents: New York City has some highly automobile-dependent suburbs38 but also has two suburbs where a majority of
commuters use public transit regularly.39 In other words, New York accommodates a wide variety of consumer preferences: preferences for city
living, preferences for sprawl, and preferences for transit-oriented suburbia.
Cities in some other afºuent countries are similar to New York City.
Over 70% of Tokyo residents walk, bicycle, or ride transit to work, as do
69% of Stockholm residents and 62% of Munich residents, respectively.40 If
some afºuent places are less “sprawling” than others, it logically follows

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

39.

40.

low-density developments, where wide, high-speed arterial streets offer few sidewalks or crosswalks.”).
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 35
(2004) (reporting that “wide residential streets without sidewalks” are now common);
Ann DeFrange, Reader Stands Ready To Battle City’s Lack of Sidewalks, Oklahoman,
June 9, 2004, at 19A, available at 2004 WLNR 21091635 (reporting that many Oklahoma City streets lack sidewalks). See also Michael Lewyn, Buckhead—Don’t
Even Think of Walking Here!, available at http://atlantaphotos.fotopic.net/p14010314.
html, (photographic illustrations of residential streets without sidewalks); Michael
Lewyn, Buford Highway—Another Bad Block for Pedestrians, available at http://
atlanta photos.fotopic. net/p14010301.html (showing photos of commercial streets
without sidewalks).
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Eye That Never Sleeps: Privacy and Law in the Internet Era,
40 Tulsa L. Rev. 561, 563 (2005).
See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (tying sprawl to “the democratization of society”
as middle class now able “to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative
of the wealthy and powerful.”).
See Carfree Census Database, supra note 31.
See City Data, 10162 Zip Code Detailed Proªle, available at http://www.citydata.com/zips/10162.html (reporting that, in one New York City zip code with average household income of over $100,000, 550 of area’s 943 households had no car in
2000).
See People v. Coutard, 454 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 642 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (“[I]n a suburban county
such as [Nassau County], the use of an automobile by most of its citizens is often as
necessary as placing bread upon their tables.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1751 (2005) (describing Nassau County as New York
City suburb).
See Carfee Census Database, supra note 31 (showing majority of residents in Hoboken, New Jersey and Bronxville, New York, get to work by using public transit);
Doug Halonen, Station Afªliates on Verge of Victory, Television Wk., Oct. 10, 2005, at
1, available at 2005 WLNR 16892609 (characterizing Bronxville as a “swank New York
suburb”); John Kelly, Trade Center Victims Were Mostly Men with Families, Houston
Chron., Oct. 27, 2001, at A13, 2001 WLNR 11719685 (mentioning Hoboken on list of
New York City suburbs).
Peter Newman & Jeffrey Kenworthy, Sustainability And Cities: Overcoming
Automobile Dependence 83 (1999).
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that public policy can affect the degree of sprawl in afºuent, democratic
societies. In other words, some low-density development might be normal in an afºuent, democratic society—but not the degree of sprawl that
makes constant driving a necessity for most people.
Bruegmann implies that the differences between the United States and
Europe are meaningless because even compact European cities have become more suburbanized and automobile-dependent.41 In Europe, however, transit ridership has actually increased in recent years: in European
Union countries, streetcar and subway ridership rose by 12.5% between
1995 and 2003,42 and despite massive highway construction by European
governments,43 the automobile’s share of European passenger transportation increased only slightly between 1995 and 2003 (from 74.1% of all passenger miles to 74.4%).44 Furthermore, after losing population for decades,
some European core cities have begun to regain population.45
Even in the United States, there is some reason to believe that sprawl
is not an unstoppable trend. American public transit ridership has risen
by over 20% in the past decade46 and (as Bruegmann admits) some American cities are beginning to grow and to retain middle-class residents,47

41. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 52 (citing numerous examples, including Paris’ loss
of jobs to its suburbs); id. at 202 (“Just as in America, European urban dwellers are
using their cars more and using public transportation less.”).
42. See European Commission, Energy and Transport in Figures 2005, Table 3.3.2,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/ªgures/pocketbook/doc/
2005/etif_2005_whole_en.pdf (“European Transport”) (listing growth rate for
“Tram and Metro,” and adding that bus ridership grew by 3.7%). A “tram” is essentially what Americans would term a “streetcar,” and a “Metro” what Americans would
describe as a “subway.” See European Union, Commission Regulation No. 1192/2003
(July 3, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_167/
l_16720030704en00130016.pdf (deªning terms).
43. See European Transport, supra note 42, Table 3.5.1 (length of motorways more than
tripled in European Union countries between 1970 and 2001).
44. European Transport, supra note 42, Table 3.3.2.
45. See ISRA, ON A THEORY OF URBAN SPRAWL AND SPRAWLING 18, available at
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/urbs/projekt/vienna_theory.pdf (stating that, according to European Urban Audit, about half of European core cities gained population
in 1990s, after losing people in earlier decades); Dep’t for Communities and Local
Gov’t, Where Do We Stand?, available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/
106/p1130106.jpg (chart depicting European Urban Audit). Moreover, central cities’
population losses in prior decades may have been caused not by consumer demand
for sprawl but by government-funded highway construction (which encouraged
suburban growth) and by regionwide population losses that depopulated city and
suburb alike. See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 42 (distinguishing Europe because
it did not experience a baby boom after World War II and, as a result, many regions
suffered population decline); supra note 43 (noting growth of highway system in
Europe), infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (explaining how highways promote suburban growth).
46. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Statistical Abstract of The
United States: 2006 722 (125th ed. 2006) (showing that, after decreasing in early
1990s, transit ridership rose from 7.7 billion passengers in 1995 to over 9.4 billion in
2003) (“2006 Abstract”). See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 269 n.49 (admitting
that “[t]ransit ridership, in the last few years, has risen faster than automobile travel”
but claiming that this fact “has not been very meaningful” because transit ridership
is so low).
47. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 51–56.
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while some American suburbs have become more densely populated.48
While some cities have continued to lose population,49 eight of America’s
ten largest cities gained population between 1990 and 2000,50 including
two (New York and Chicago) that had lost population in earlier decades.51
Similarly, several smaller cities gained population in the 1990s after having lost people in earlier decades.52 Thus, Bruegmann’s vision of sprawl as
inevitable and natural is belied by the countertrends towards higher transit ridership and urban recovery.
In sum, some sprawling development may be universal, but the
amount of automobile-dependent development in a city or region has
varied tremendously between cities, and the trend towards sprawl is no
longer one-sided. Thus, sprawl in its most extreme forms is by no means
inevitable in free, afºuent societies.
B. Myth Two: The Market, Not Government, Created Sprawl
Bruegmann’s theory that sprawl is “natural”53 implicitly rests upon
the assumption that sprawl is almost entirely a result of consumer preferences, as expressed in the free market. If sprawl has been caused by government regulations and programs, sprawl is hardly inevitable or natural
because there would be less sprawl in a more libertarian society. To his
credit, Bruegmann (unlike some other pro-sprawl commentators)54 is at
least willing to respond to arguments that sprawl has been partially
caused by government policies rather than the free market.55 In particular,
he admits that numerous commentators attribute sprawl to government
highway spending,56 federal mortgage subsidies targeted towards subur-

48. Id. at 67–69.
49. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006, supra note 29, at 480 (listing
gains and losses of various cities).
50. Id.
51. Id. (showing that New York lost population between 1950 and 1980, and Chicago lost
population between 1950 and 1990).
52. Id. (showing that Indianapolis, San Francisco, Fort Worth, Seattle, Boston, Denver,
Portland, Kansas City, Atlanta, Omaha, Oakland, Minneapolis, Tampa, Madison, and
Fort Wayne all lost population in the 1970s but regained residents in at least one of
the following two decades). Ten of these ªfteen cities apparently continued to gain
population between 2000 and 2004. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 32–35 (estimating that Fort Worth, Indianapolis, Denver, Omaha, Seattle, Portland, Atlanta,
Tampa, Kansas City, and Madison gained population while Boston, San Francisco,
Oakland, Minneapolis, and Fort Wayne did not).
53. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (claiming sprawl is perhaps a “predictable result
of increasing wealth”).
54. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, “Urban Sprawl” and Liberal Gall (June 29, 1999), available at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell062999.asp (attacking “a
government-sponsored crusade against urban sprawl” without acknowledging the
possibility of pro-sprawl government policies, and asserting that “[t]he real objection
[to sprawl] may be that all this is going on without the guiding hand of Big Brother.”).
55. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 304–35; Gillham, supra note 1, at 15–16, 32–38, 42–45,
134–36 (discussing how government policies have accelerated sprawl).
56. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101–02.
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ban homeowners,57 and pro-sprawl zoning regulations.58 Bruegmann’s
responses to these arguments, however, are based on questionable logic.
1. Do Highways Matter?
Throughout the twentieth century, government at all levels favored
highways over public transit.59 Government highway spending began
early in the twentieth century60 but accelerated after 1956 when the federal government enacted the Interstate Highway Act, committing the federal government to paying ninety percent of the cost of America’s interstate highway network.61 In the decades immediately after the passage of
the Highway Act, central cities lost population faster than ever before or
afterward.62 Highway spending almost certainly accelerated suburbanization: when a government builds a superhighway from downtown X to
suburb Y, people who work downtown can commute more quickly from
suburb Y to downtown X, and thus are more likely to move to suburb Y.
By contrast, when dirt roads served suburb Y, it was far less appealing to
commuters.63
In addition to making suburbs more attractive to commuters, highways
made cities less attractive to inhabitants by destroying urban neighborhoods. Millions of houses in cities were bulldozed in order to create space
for highways and other redevelopment schemes.64 For example, nearly
20% of Baltimore’s African Americans were displaced by I-95 and I-83,65
20,000 families in Miami were displaced by highway construction,66 and

57. Id. at 102–04.
58. Id. at 105–06.
59. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 312–15 (giving a brief history of government support for
highways).
60. Id. at 312–13. See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101 (“Most cities and urban areas
had extensive plans for superhighways already in the 1930s; many of them had allocated large sums of county and state money to begin construction of these roads long
before the federal interstate highway program of the mid-1950s.”).
61. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 35 (describing Interstate Highway Act in more detail).
62. Compare Patrick A. Simmons & Robert A. Lang, The Urban Turnaround, in Redeªning
Urban & Suburban America 51, 54 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003) (older
cities lost more population in 1960s and 1970s than in earlier or later decades) with
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of The United
States: 1952 18–21 (73d ed. 1952) (before the passage of the Highway Act, of eighteen
cities with population over 500,000, all but four gained population during 1930s, and
all but one gained population during 1940s).
63. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that highways “improved access between
city and suburb, making it easier to commute to ever more distant outlying areas.”);
Lewyn, supra note 30, at 321 (citation omitted) (reporting that when National Association of Home Builders asked what amenity would encourage them to move to a
new area, 55% of respondents picked highway access, more than any alternative).
64. See Tullock v. State Highway Comm’n of Mo., 507 F.2d 712, 714 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974)
(showing that between 1950 and 1968, over two million dwellings destroyed due to
highway construction and urban renewal). Sixty-two thousand individuals and families were displaced by federal highway programs in 1968 alone). Cf. Gillham, supra
note 1, at 42–43 (describing “urban renewal” program mentioned in Tullock).
65. Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?,
21 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 370 (1997).
66. See Andrea Eaton, Impact of Urban Renewal or Land Development Initiatives on AfricanAmerican Neighborhoods in Dade County, Florida, 3 How. Scroll 49, 55 (1995).
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19,000 Clevelanders were displaced by one downtown freeway.67 Even
neighborhoods not destroyed by highways were damaged by expressway
construction. For example, before the enactment of the Highway Act, Claiborne Avenue was the main street of the Treme section of New Orleans,
with 200 businesses and a 6100-foot median.68 Highway bureaucrats built
I-10 on Claiborne Avenue, cutting the neighborhood in half and turning
the median into a strip of dirt.69 After the destruction of Claiborne Avenue,
Treme deteriorated: a more recent survey of area businesses showed that
63% of business owners would not invest in another business in the
neighborhood because of the neighborhood’s physical unattractiveness
and high crime.70
Since the government did not always replace housing units that were
destroyed in order to make room for highways, highway construction reduced the urban housing supply and, in turn, the city population. In Cincinnati, for example, the construction of I-75 displaced residents of the
city’s African American West End. The displaced West Enders thus ºooded
nearby neighborhoods (causing massive racial transition and “white ºight”
from those neighborhoods).71 One such neighborhood, Mount Auburn,
changed from 84% white in 1960 to 74% black in 1970;72 presumably, at
least some of the whites who left Mount Auburn moved to Cincinnati’s
suburbs.
When a city loses population to its suburbs, it may become less attractive in a variety of other ways. For example, the city’s tax base might decline, forcing the city to raise taxes to pay for city services.73 Moreover, if
the people who leave the city are disproportionately middle- and upperclass, the remaining, relatively low-income residents might support redis-

67. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (citation omitted).
68. Beverly H. Wright, New Orleans Neighborhoods Under Siege, in Just Transportation
121, 132–33 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnston eds., 1997).
69. Id. at 133–34.
70. Id. at 135.
71. See Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 1993 WL 761489, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1993) (noting
that, in Cincinnati, “African American citizens were being forced to move into previously white neighborhoods as a result of being displaced by the construction of the
Interstate Highway through their neighborhood,” thus implying that government
did not provide replacement housing in their neighborhoods to people whose homes
were destroyed due to highway construction); Dan Hurley, New Y, Old Vision for the
West End, Cincinnati Post, May 26, 2006, available at http://news.cincypost.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060526/LIFE/605260340/-1/BACK01 (reporting that
West End was an African-African neighborhood in which many homes were destroyed by I-75); Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (displaced West End residents ºooded
nearby neighborhoods).
72. Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 Marq. L. Rev.
301, 316 n.128 (citation omitted).
73. See Katharine J. Jackson, The Need For Regional Management of Growth: Boulder, Colorado As A Case Study, 37 Urb. Law. 299, 303 (2005) (“[A]s a city’s population shrinks,
property values and property tax bases decrease, ‘forcing [the city] to raise taxes to
pay for basic city services.’”); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742, 750
n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (“[C]ities are trying to reverse the population movements that
have left them with concentrations of the poor, high service demands, and a stagnant
tax base.”).
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tributionist policies that increase taxes and drive away even more middleclass voters.74
Nevertheless, Bruegmann speculates that highways may have actually helped cities, noting that roads “were heavily supported by centralcity interests because these individuals believed that these roads, like the
railroads before them, would reinforce the centrality of the downtown
and make it easier for people from throughout the region to get to it.”75
However, Bruegmann does not explain why he thinks this view is correct.76 Similarly, he asserts that, “[g]iven the strong rebound of many of
these cities in recent years, it is altogether possible that, at some point in
the near future, most people will conclude that [expressways] were actually largely beneªcial for central cities.”77 Again, Bruegmann does not explain why “most people” would reach this conclusion. In fact, his conclusion seems highly implausible, given the rapid decline of cities during the
years immediately after the passage of the Highway Act.78 If cities rebound, their success is likely to be despite, not because of, the highways
that fed suburban growth.
Bruegmann’s weakest argument is that suburb-oriented government
spending merely compensates for urban-oriented government spending.
For example, he argues that “federal spending today goes more heavily
per capita to central cities than to suburbs, primarily because of the enormous price tag of social security payments, which go primarily to an
older population that remains disproportionately in the central cities.”79
Even if it was true that senior citizens mostly lived in central cities,80 Social Security payments do not compensate for highway spending because
Social Security spending goes to a retiree whether she lives in a city or a
suburb. By contrast, highways going from a city to a suburb beneªt suburbanites by shortening their commutes, but arguably harm city residents
both by destroying city neighborhoods and by encouraging outmigration

74. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 336–38 (discussing Washington, D.C., under Marion
Barry as a case study of high-tax government caused by ºight of middle-class voters
from city electorate).
75. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 108.
76. It is unclear whether Bruegmann actually believes that highways help downtowns.
He writes that highways “made leaving town easier” but then writes that “both [highways and railroads] caused some dispersal and both caused some centralization.” Id.
The ªrst remark suggests that highways did cause sprawl, while the second statement is more equivocal.
77. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101–02.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105.
80. In fact, this is not always the case. For example, in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the percentage of central city population over 65 is actually lower than the percentage of metropolitan area population over 65. See U.S. Census Bureau, Cities
With 100,000 Or More Population in 2000 Ranked by Percent Population 65
Years and Over, 2000 in Alphabetic Order, available at http://www.census.gov/
statab/ccdb/cit2061a.txt (in New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, percentages
of urban population over 65 were 11.7%, 9.7%, and 10.3% respectively); U.S. Census
Bureau, Metropolitan Area Rankings of Persons 65 Years of Age and Over,
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/metro09.prn (comparable percentages for New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago metropolitan areas were 13.4%, 10.2%,
and 11.3%, respectively).

Book Reviewg 91
from cities (thus reducing urban tax bases, leading to higher taxes).81 In
other words, Social Security spending is place-neutral—but highway
spending is not.
2. Housing Subsidies
Since the 1930s the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has insured home construction loans in order to stimulate the housing industry.82 Speciªcally, the FHA guaranteed over 90% of the value of collateral
for home loans so that down payments of only 10% of home value became the norm (as opposed to the 33% down payments common before
FHA’s creation).83 For the ªrst few decades of its existence, the FHA refused to guarantee home loans in racially integrated areas.84 Since suburban areas were usually whiter than cities,85 this policy encouraged Americans to purchase FHA-insured homes in suburbs.86
Bruegmann apparently defends the FHA’s racist policies, asserting
that “there was, in fact, a great deal of evidence over many years indicating that property values did tend to drop as neighborhoods got older and
experienced ethnic or racial turnover.”87 Even if Bruegmann’s claim is factually correct,88 he overlooks the possibility that subsidies such as FHA

81. See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (describing the impact of highways
upon cities). Bruegmann also asserts that in any city/suburb accounting, “the spending by the federal government since the eighteenth century for ports and railroads,
bridges and highways, universities and hospitals located primarily in the central cities would have to be factored in.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105. This argument
lacks merit for two reasons. First, since government was far smaller prior to the 1950s
than it is today, such expenses were not always government-ªnanced. See Eric A.
Cesnik, The American Street, 33 Urb. Law. 147, 167 (2001) (explaining that streets were
often privately ªnanced until the twentieth century); U.S. Ofªce of Mgmt. and
Budget, Budget of The United States Gov’t: Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 2007
23–24 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf
(showing that federal spending was only 3.4% of GNP in 1930, grew to 11.6% of GNP
in 1948, and is now about 20% of GNP); id. at 312–13 (showing that state and local
government spending grew from 5.6% of GNP in 1948 to over 11% of GNP today).
Second, highway spending, as noted above, was often not beneªcial for cities. See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text.
82. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 37; Lewyn, supra note 30, at 305.
83. See Victor A. Bolden, Where Does New York City Go From Here: Chaos or Community, 23
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1031, 1052 n.26 (1996).
84. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of The
United States 207–08 (1985); Gillham, supra note 1, at 135.
85. The racial difference between cities and suburbs may itself have been due to suburban governments’ zoning policies that excluded inexpensive housing, thus keeping
African Americans out of those suburbs. See John Powell, Segregation and Educational
Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 337, 352 (1996)
(explaining that, because blacks are poorer than whites, suburban exclusion of inexpensive housing excludes African Americans from suburbs).
86. Gillham, supra note 1, at 134–35.
87. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 102. He also states that “[n]o amount of regulatory control would have altered this fact of life.” Id. The FHA, however, was not trying to
“control” private racism but, rather, to subsidize such racism—a very different issue.
88. Bruegmann provides no evidence for this assertion. Although he does footnote this
statement, his footnote relates to an entirely different issue: the anti-urban bias of an
entirely different government agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC).
HOLC “redlined” urban neighborhoods by issuing maps that graded neighborhoods
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loan insurance might make moving to suburbia cheaper at the margin:
that is, some people might be willing to leave a low-value urban neighborhood if they could make a 10% down payment on a suburban home, but
would not be willing to move if they had to make a 33% down payment
on a suburban home. To the extent that would-be homeowners fell into
this category, FHA mortgage insurance encouraged suburban growth.
Moreover, the FHA’s tilt towards suburbia included a variety of policies unrelated to racial turnover. The FHA deªned “low-risk” areas appropriate for FHA loans not just as “lily-white” neighborhoods, but also
as neighborhoods that were newer and less compact—policies that favored suburbia because suburbs tended to be newer and less densely
populated.89 FHA also set minimum standards for new housing construction that mandated low-density, automobile-dependent design.90 Thus,
FHA policies both subsidized migration to suburbs and mandated that
those suburbs be designed in a “sprawling” manner.
As a result of these policies, the overwhelming majority of FHA-insured
homes were in suburbs, even where nearby central cities were predominantly white. For example, in metropolitan St. Louis, 91% of new homes
insured by the FHA during the 1930s were in suburban locations,91 even
though the city of St. Louis was less than 12% black in 1930.92

89.
90.

91.
92.

and colored the riskiest areas red. Amy Hillier, Redlining in Philadelphia, available at http://cml.upenn.edu/redlining/intro.html. Bruegmann writes that HOLC’s
inºuence was limited because it did not make its maps available to private lenders.
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 248 n.12. However, Amy Hillier, the researcher cited by
Bruegmann, has pointed out that HOLC was far less inºuential than FHA. See Hillier, supra (stating that the FHA manuals “established highly racialized neighborhood
standards that lenders were encouraged to consider if they wanted to receive FHA
insurance. FHA’s neighborhood appraisal standards ultimately had a much greater
impact on lending patterns in urban communities than HOLC’s maps.”). Thus,
Bruegmann’s footnote does not support either his broad claim that FHA’s anti-urban
bias was unimportant or his narrower claim that racial integration lowers property
values.
See Jackson, supra note 84, at 207–08 (describing FHA policies and quoting FHA
manuals asserting that “crowded neighborhoods lessen desirability” as do “older
properties in a neighborhood”).
Compare Michael Southworth & Eran Ben-Joseph, Regulated Streets: The Evolution of Standards for Suburban Residential Streets 34–36 (1993) (showing
that the FHA favored cul-de-sacs over grid streets, houses sitting on at least 6000
square feet of land, and blocks at least 600 feet long) with Reid Ewing, Pedestrianand Transit-Friendly Design: A Primer for Smart Growth 2–4, available at
http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/ptfd_primer.pdf (arguing pedestrian-friendly,
transit-friendly development requires higher densities than are common in many
suburbs and blocks no longer than 300 feet; higher density means more people can
walk to transit stops, and short blocks mean pedestrians can cross streets more frequently) and Duany Et Al., supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that the cul-de-sac street
pattern discourages walking because residential streets are not connected to each
other, which means pedestrians must go out of their way to visit nearby residential
streets).
Gillham, supra note 1, at 135 (citing data for St. Louis, and citing similar results for
other metropolitan areas).
See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of The United States 1935 25
(57th ed. 1935), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/
1935-02.pdf (showing that the city of St. Louis was 11.6% black).
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More plausibly, Bruegmann points out that the federal income tax deduction for interest on mortgages does not favor suburbs because this deduction can be used for “any kind of single-family unit, whether a house
in the suburbs or a condominium in a high-rise downtown.”93 Even here,
however, Bruegmann oversimpliªes. Condominiums were not common
(or even authorized by most states’ statutes) until the 1960s.94 Before that
time, Americans could not easily purchase apartments95 and thus had to
buy a house in order to qualify for the home mortgage deduction. Because houses tend to be disproportionately located in suburbs,96 the home
mortgage deduction tended to favor migration to suburbia until the
1960s.
3. Zoning
As Bruegmann admits, municipal zoning codes often mandate segregation of housing from other land uses and require low population density.97 These policies, by increasing the distance between housing and
other land uses, ensure that many Americans cannot live within walking
distance of shops or ofªces, thus effectively forcing Americans into their
cars.98 Nevertheless, Bruegmann asserts that “zoning itself cannot be blamed
for most of the sprawl that has occurred because sprawl was well underway long before zoning became common in American cities, which only
started to happen in the 1920s.”99 Bruegmann’s suggestion that “most of
the sprawl that has occurred” preceded zoning is misleading. As of 2003,
there were 105.8 million occupied housing units in the United States.100
Only 9.6 million of these units (or about 9%) were built before 1920.101
Thus, most of America’s housing was created after zoning became common.
Bruegmann also suggests that, because some suburbs have become
more densely populated in recent years, “zoning has changed as neces-

93. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 103.
94. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 59 (stating that “it wasn’t until the 1960s that the condominium was introduced here.”); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1104, 1109–10
(1969) (explaining that the ªrst state statute dealing with condominiums was in 1958,
and federal mortgage insurance for condominiums was not available until 1961).
95. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 59 (explaining that the condominium form of ownership “made it possible for city dwellers to own rather than rent their apartments.”).
96. See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing The Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827,
839 (1999) (explaining that suburbs often exclude or restrict construction of apartments through zoning).
97. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105.
98. Cf. Andres Duany & Emily Talen, Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1445, 1447 (2002) (explaining that, in neighborhoods organized
around “the mobility pattern of the pedestrian,” most residents should live no more
than a quarter of a mile from stores and schools).
99. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105.
100. U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States, 2003,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab1a1.htm.
101. Id. About 11.8 million units were built between 1920 and 1940, 21.5 million between
1940 and 1960, 40 million between 1960 and 1980, and 38.7 million after 1980.
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sary to accommodate market realities”102—in other words, that zoning
merely mimics the market, mandating sprawl when the market wants
sprawl and changing when the market wants change.
A few lines later, however, Bruegmann concedes that zoning occasionally frustrates the market, asserting that low-density zoning designed
to prevent rural areas from turning into suburbs “almost certainly forced
many landowners to buy more land than they otherwise would have
wanted, leading to lower densities than would have been the case without the regulations.”103 Bruegmann’s treatment of zoning thus seems to be
governed by a double standard: conventional pro-sprawl zoning merely
tracks the market while zoning designed to limit sprawl successfully frustrates consumer demand.
Moreover, surveys of developers suggest that pro-sprawl land use
regulation really does impede, rather than follow, market pressures for
more compact housing. In 2001, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a developers’ trade association,104 conducted a survey asking developers about
the impact of zoning upon “alternatives to conventional, low-density,
automobile-oriented, suburban development.”105 According to the survey,
85.4% of developers agreed that the supply of such development was inadequate to meet market demand,106 and 78.2% of developers identiªed
government regulation as a signiªcant barrier to such development.107
The ULI survey also revealed that over sixty percent of developers in both
cities and inner suburbs stated that they wished to build more compact
development than was generally allowable under government regulation.108
For example, in California’s Silicon Valley, exploding housing prices
might, in the absence of government regulation, cause landowners to
build smaller houses and more multifamily developments in order to
meet consumer demand for affordable housing.109 In Silicon Valley communities such as Santa Clara and Cupertino, however, almost every prop-

102. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 106.
103. Id. at 106–07.
104. Jonathan Levine, Zoned Out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices in Transportation and Metropolitan Land-Use 125 (2006) (describing ULI as “national organization of land developers”).
105. Id. at 126.
106. Id. at 128. This group was divided between 66.8% who believed that there was generally not enough compact development to meet consumer demand and an additional 18.6% who responded that the supply of such development was high enough
to meet consumer demand but not in the “right locations” (presumably meaning the
neighborhoods where consumer demand for compact development was highest). Id.
107. Id. at 129. By contrast, only 35.3% invoked ªnancing as an obstacle to more compact
development, and only 26.3% listed inadequate consumer demand. Id. Thus, it cannot plausibly be argued that pedestrian-friendly development is rare solely because
of lack of market demand.
108. Levine, supra note 104, at 131. In particular, about 80% of developers indicated that
they would develop more compactly in inner suburbs if zoning was less burdensome, and over 60% similarly indicated that relaxed regulations would lead them to
develop more densely in central cities. Id. By contrast, developers in outer suburbs
and rural areas were less interested in more compact development. See id.
109. See id. at 77.
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erty zoned as single-family in the 1960s remains single-family today.110
Similarly, in Massachusetts only three-tenths of one percent of singlefamily parcels were rezoned between 1970 and 1999,111 despite the fact
that housing prices near Boston have exploded.112 Thus, zoning does not
always respond to consumer demand for more compact development.113
C. Myth Three: Sprawl Is Harmless
Even if government spending and government zoning policies have
depopulated cities and made suburbia automobile-dependent, sprawl is
hardly a serious social problem if its overall effects are harmless or beneªcial. Therefore, Bruegmann attacks a wide variety of claims about the evil
effects of sprawl. Bruegmann’s rebuttal of some anti-sprawl claims is
fairly persuasive, given the difªculty of establishing cause-and-effect relationships between sprawl and other social problems. For example, Bruegmann correctly suggests that there is no way of knowing whether limiting
sprawl will reduce energy consumption enough to reduce global warming.114 Similarly, it is not clear whether sprawl costs suburban taxpayers
signiªcantly more than compact development,115 or whether sprawl will
ever reduce food supply by creating a shortage of farmland.116

110. Id. at 204 n.1.
111. Id. at 78.
112. See Edward L. Glaeser, Jenny Schuetz & Bryce Ward, Regulation and the Rise
of Housing Prices in Greater Boston 1, 7 (2006), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/rappaport/downloads/housing_regulations/regulation_housingprices.pdf
(housing prices grew by 210% in metro Boston between 1980 and 2004, while number
of permits decreased).
113. Indeed, local governments have a strong political incentive to ignore consumer demand for new housing of any type: the homeowners who often dominate local electorates may wish to preserve the status quo in order to keep housing scarce and thus
keep property values high. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Regulation and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 22 J.L. & Pol. 33, 39–40 (2006) (explaining local government
incentives behind rigid zoning laws); Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 162 (describing
homeowners as part of “incumbents’ club” that beneªts from restrictions on housing
supply).
114. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 149 (“Even if everyone in the world came to live in
the same way as the inhabitants of European central cities, this would certainly not,
in itself, solve the global warming problem.”) Of course, if sprawl increases pollution, it probably contributes in some degree to global warming. See also infra notes
116–123 and accompanying text (describing relationship between sprawl and pollution). However, there is no way of knowing how signiªcant that contribution is.
115. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 125. I note, however, that even if sprawl does not
affect suburban or statewide tax burdens, sprawl may increase the taxes of urban
taxpayers under certain circumstances. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 336–37 (stating
that, where new development is outside city limits, city taxes may increase because:
(1) “if a city’s middle class migrates en masse to suburbia, its tax base will be smaller
and it, therefore, will, other things being equal, have to raise taxes or reduce services”; and (2) a poorer city electorate is more likely to favor redistributive ªscal policies).
116. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 142 (arguing that sprawl does not endanger food
supplies because, so far, “agricultural yields are going up and agricultural prices going down worldwide despite a reduction in the amount of land devoted to agriculture”).
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Bruegmann’s handling of other issues, however, is far less supple. He
attempts, for example, to deny the link between air pollution117 and
sprawl by writing that the “cause of the pollution was neither sprawl nor
the automobile itself but, rather, the inefªcient fuel source it used.”118 As
long as automobiles are using those inefªcient fuel sources, however, they
are creating pollution. It logically follows that, by increasing driving, sprawl
increases pollution. Perhaps someday automobiles will use more efªcient
fuel sources; until that day comes, however,119 more sprawl (other factors
being equal) means more driving which, in turn, means more pollution.
Bruegmann even tries to blame pollution on city-dwellers by asserting
that “the higher density of automobile usage in the city meant that pollution was almost invariably worse in dense areas.”120 Even if this statement
is factually correct,121 the “higher density of automobile use” in the city is
partly caused by suburbanites driving from automobile-dependent suburbs and urbanites driving to jobs in those suburbs.122 If these drivers
lived and worked in places where they could get to work without driving
(rather than in sprawling, automobile-dependent suburbs), dense areas
might have fewer cars on their streets, and thus less automobile-induced

117. Air pollution is distinguishable from global warming because, even if global warming never becomes a signiªcant social problem, air pollution creates day-to-day
health hazards such as lung damage. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 121 (stating that
pollution causes damage to lung tissue as well as “reproductive and neurological
problems”).
118. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 127. Bruegmann inexplicably adds: “For many of those
in the anti-suburban camp, however, developing new and cleaner fuel sources was
the last thing they wanted. It would only lead to more driving and more sprawl.” Id.
This unveriªable claim exempliªes the ad hominem fallacy: Bruegmann is trying to
“shift [his] argument from the point being discussed (ad rem) to irrelevant personal
characteristics of an opponent (ad hominem). Instead of addressing the issue presented by an opponent, this argument makes the opponent the issue.” Paul E. Salmanca, Constitutional Protection for Conversations Between Therapists and Clients, 64 Mo.
L.Rev. 77, 97 n.106 (1999) (citation omitted). The sentence quoted seeks to persuade
readers by attacking the alleged “anti-suburban camp” rather than focusing on the
relationship between sprawl and pollution.
119. And maybe even after that day comes, if auto travel increases faster than fuel
efªciency. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 114 (Environmental Protection Agency projects that, although cars are less toxic than they were in 1970, “growth in VMT [vehicle miles traveled] will offset progress in reducing air toxics by early this century,
causing air pollution from highway vehicles to actually increase within the next
twenty years.”).
120. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 127.
121. In fact, it is by no means clear that compact places are more polluted. See Michael
Lewyn, Sprawl, Growth Boundaries and the Rehnquist Court, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 1, 47
(2002) (showing pollution ªgures for various metropolitan areas, and concluding that
“[m]etropolitan areas with high levels of public transit use tend to have relatively
clean air.”).
122. For example, in metropolitan Baltimore, 10% of all workers commute from city to
suburb and 11% commute from suburb to city. See Baltimore Metro. Council, TSC
Notes, available at http://www.baltometro.org/mambo/content/view/611/0/
#household. Many of these suburbs are extremely automobile-dependent. See Job
Opportunities Task Force, Baltimore’s Choice: Workers and Jobs for a Thriving Economy 22, available at http://www.jotf.org/pdf/baltimoreschoice.pdf (reporting statistics that indicate mass transit service is minimal in Baltimore’s growing outer
suburbs).
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air pollution.123 Thus, sprawl (other factors being equal) increases automobile-induced pollution even in central cities.
Bruegmann’s treatment of the relationship between sprawl and obesity is similarly illogical. He writes that “ethnic and racial characteristics
and low income are much more closely associated with obesity than any
particular land-use pattern.”124 This claim presents a false dichotomy: either poverty causes obesity or sprawl causes obesity. The claim ignores the
possibility, however, that both may be causes: poor people may be more
likely to be obese than rich people, but poor people (or for that matter,
not-so-poor people) living in a neighborhood that discourages walking may
also be even more likely to be obese than other people with similar incomes.
Furthermore, Bruegmann’s attempt to break the link between sprawl
and trafªc congestion rests on a slender factual base. At ªrst glance, it
might seem obvious that suburban life might increase driving, which, in
turn, increases congestion. Bruegmann defends sprawl, however, on the
grounds that “congestion and commuting times tend to rise, not fall, with
density.”125 For example, Bruegmann cites Kansas City and Oklahoma
City as role models of low-density places with little trafªc congestion. Indeed, like most smaller cities, they do have less congestion than bigger
cities.126 Bruegmann’s own examples, however, rebut his claim. If Bruegmann’s theory was correct, these low-density cities would have experienced reduced trafªc congestion if their densities fell over time. This reduced trafªc congestion did not occur in Kansas City, however, where
regionwide population density decreased by over 20% (from 1982 persons
per square mile to 1435)—while the annual congestion-related delay per
rush-hour traveler rose from 2 hours per year to 17 hours per year.127 In
Oklahoma City, moreover, population density did not change signiªcantly
(increasing slightly from 1524 persons per square mile to 1568) but congestion nevertheless increased from 3 hours per year to 12 hours per

123. Even in a city where all commuters drove to work, commuting to and from distant
suburbs may increase urban pollution if a commuter driving to or from suburbia
drives more miles within the city than she would have driven if she lived in the city
and drove to a job in the city.
124. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 256 n.14.
125. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 141.
126. See Texas Transportation Institute, 2005 Urban Mobility Study, National
Congestion Tables, Table 1, available at http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_
data/tables/national/table_1.pdf (listing congestion for various regions and noting
that largest regions had the most congestion while smaller regions had the least). The
Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) is a state research agency afªliated with Texas
A&M University, which regularly conducts “urban mobility studies” addressing trafªc
congestion. See Lewyn, supra note 121, at 43 (describing TTI); Bruegmann, supra note
1, at 255 n.8 (citing TTI data).
127. Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Kansas City, MO-KS, available at
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/kansas_city.pdf. It could be
argued, of course, that places such as Kansas City failed to build enough roads to accommodate trafªc. See infra notes 159–168 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between road construction and congestion). This argument is weak because,
if lower density reduces congestion, Kansas City’s decreased density should have
reduced trafªc without any need for massive road construction.
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year.128 Thus, sprawl has failed to reduce congestion, even in low-density,
low-congestion regions.
Bruegmann also claims that commuting times have not increased due
to sprawl because jobs have followed population to the suburbs.129 In fact,
however, the percentage of workers with ninety-minute round-trip commutes has increased by 95% since 1990.130 As a matter of common sense,
such long-distance commutes may be an inevitable result of sprawl: if
Employer X moves from downtown to northern suburb Y, its employees
who live in northern suburb Y may have shorter commutes but its urban
employees and its employees in southern suburbs may have even longer
commutes.131
More important than the anti-sprawl arguments Bruegmann mishandles are the arguments that he simply ignores. His chapter discussing the
social costs of sprawl contains a subheading for “Social Concerns and Equity Problems”132 but his discussion under that subheading completely overlooks a major “equity problem” with sprawl—the plight of the carless
young, old, poor, and disabled who lack access to jobs and shopping when
streets are unªt for pedestrians and transit service is inadequate.133 Almost
one-third of all Americans have no drivers’ license,134 including about 11.5%
of Americans over eighteen.135 This ªgure almost certainly understates the
number of non-drivers, since some Americans acquired a drivers’ license

128. Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Oklahoma City, OK, available at
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/oklahoma_city.pdf.
129. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 141 (“[T]he notion that sprawl causes congestion or
longer commuting trips is difªcult to sustain in the face of data that show that commuting times in the United States did not increase very much . . . . The reason was
that the decentralization of residences was accompanied by a decentralization of jobs
and other activities”). I note that despite the decentralization of employment, suburbanites continue to have longer commutes than city residents. See Surface Transp.
Pol. Project, Transp. Data From the 2000 Census, available at http://www.osc.
state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/pop_trends.pdf (reporting that average suburbanite spends 26.9 minutes traveling to work as opposed to 24.9 for central city residents).
130. Michelle Conlin et al., Extreme Commuting, available at http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/05_08/b3921127.htm.
131. See Steve Belmont, Cities In Full 149 (2002) (explaining this point in more detail).
132. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 143. Instead of focusing upon the effects of sprawl upon
non-drivers generally, he focuses on the question of whether cities should annex
suburbs in order to improve urban tax bases, id. at 143-45—an important but not nationwide problem, since in many regions, cities have been able to annex a signiªcant
portion of their suburbs. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 141 (ªnding that of twenty
largest U.S. cities, seven were able to annex over 100 miles of suburban territory between 1950 and 1990).
133. See supra notes 9, 30–34 and accompanying text (noting difªculty of life for American
non-drivers, and pointing out that young, old and poor are especially likely to suffer
from such problems).
134. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 8, 712 (showing that of the 290.7 million residents of the United States in 2003, only 196.1 million were licensed drivers, or about
67% of resident population).
135. Of the 217.7 million persons over 18 in the United States, 25 million have no driver’s
license. Id. at 13 (217.7 million persons over 18 lived in United States in 2003); Spadafora, supra note 29, at 117 (after subtraction of 3.4 million under-18 drivers, table
shows 192.7 million licensed drivers in 2003).
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at one time but do not own a car.136 Non-drivers tend to be among the
most physically and economically disadvantaged members of American
society. Twenty-one percent of Americans over sixty-ªve do not drive,137
most children obviously do not drive,138 almost half of disabled Americans
have no car,139 and the majority of welfare recipients do not own cars.140
Non-drivers, however, are not characters in Bruegmann’s story of
suburban triumph.141 In fact, Brugemann is an aggressive defender of
government-funded road construction,142 apparently ignoring the possibility that, by moving jobs to suburbia, expressways move jobs to areas
far from public transit and thus inaccessible to people without cars.143 Despite Bruegmann’s attempts to tie sprawl to freedom,144 he is a huge proponent of “Big Government” if it supports suburbia—even if “Big Government’s” decisions reduce the mobility of non-drivers.
Instead of discussing the impact of sprawl upon the carless poor and
disabled, Bruegmann uses class-war tactics to defend sprawl by characterizing the public debate over sprawl as a conºict between the middle
class, which allegedly beneªts from the opportunity to move to suburbia,
and the upper class, which wants suburbia all to itself.145 Bruegmann’s
tale of class war is incomplete, however, because it overlooks the impact
of sprawl upon the poor who cannot afford cars146 or suburban homes.147
136. In seven states, the number of licensed drivers actually exceeds the number of registered motor vehicles, a fact suggesting that some license holders do not actually possess a motor vehicle. Id. at 118. For example, some people with drivers’ licenses may
have given up cars after moving to a neighborhood where auto ownership was not
necessary, or may live in a household with a family member who owns a car.
137. See Plungis & Bunkley, supra note 9.
138. Spadafora, supra note 29, at 118 (showing that in most states, the minimum age for a
learner’s permit is 15 or over).
139. See Julie Mason, Bush Unveils Program for Disabled, Houston Chron., June 29, 2000,
at A11, available at 2000 WNLR 9368643 (according to Karen Hughes, spokeswoman
for then-Governor Bush, 25 million of 54 million disabled Americans were dependent on public transportation).
140. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the
Urban Poor, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 173, 183 n.61 (2001).
141. Bruegmann does mention that “[t]here are probably good reasons to provide more
subsidies to some forms of public transportation in the United States today.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 147. He fails, however, to state what those “good reasons” are
and what “forms” are most deserving.
142. See id. at 192–94. Cf. supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (discussing the suburbanizing impact of highways).
143. See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 (“[W]hile most suburban jobs are readily accessible
by car, only a small percentage are accessible by public transit.”).
144. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that sprawl is “the preferred settlement
pattern everywhere in the world where there is a certain measure of afºuence and
where citizens have some choice in where they live.”).
145. Id. at 115 (“As long as only a small number of the wealthiest and most powerful
families occupied the most land in the most attractive locations, there was very little
sustained or organized protest”); see also id. at 125 (describing the “middle-class suburbia” under attack by “upper-middle class citizen[s]”); id. at 135 (describing one
popular song’s lyrics about “ticky tacky” suburban housing as “criticism of workingclass and middle-class culture”).
146. See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 & n.61 (noting that most welfare recipients do not
own cars).
147. See Georgette Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 607, 616 n.31 (1997) (noting that poor often cannot afford to live in sub-
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Bruegmann likewise overlooks the ªscal impact of compulsory motoring upon the vehicle-owning majority. The average American household
spends $6,960 on vehicle purchases, gasoline, vehicle maintenance and
repair, and vehicle insurance.148 To the extent that vehicle ownership is a
virtually compulsory result of government policy,149 these expenditures
are essentially a government-imposed tax, similar to the income tax or
property taxes.150
Bruegmann writes that sprawl creates “mobility, privacy and choice.”151
Where (as in large chunks of the United States) sprawl is so all-encompassing that automobiles are necessities rather than luxuries, however,
sprawl actually limits the mobility of non-drivers and impairs consumer
choice for drivers.
D. Myth Four: Sprawl Cannot Be Limited Without Suffocating
Government Interference
Bruegmann’s discussion of the effects of anti-sprawl measures, although sometimes ºawed, is more balanced than the rest of his book. He
discusses numerous policies designed to limit sprawl, correctly pointing
out that some attempts to limit sprawl through land use regulation have
been ineffective152 or have raised land prices by constricting the supply of
land.153
It is unclear, however, whether Bruegmann thinks these negative effects are inevitable. In discussing Oregon’s planning system (which limits
suburban development around Portland and other Oregon cities by prohibiting large-scale development outside governmentally designated “urban growth boundaries”),154 Bruegmann goes back and forth between
condemning the Oregon system and acknowledging that the effects of
growth boundaries upon housing prices are unclear. At one point, Bruegmann writes that the “losers” from the growth boundary include “all of
the potential future inhabitants of the city [who] will pay sharply higher
prices for their houses than those who arrived before the growth man-
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urbs); Gillham, supra note 1, at 132 (noting that the majority of America’s poor live
in central cities).
See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 457 (calculations made by author based on list of
expenditures for each individual item).
See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (explaining how automobile ownership
is almost compulsory in much of America. Cf. supra notes 60–113 and accompanying
text (showing how government policy has facilitated sprawl).
Of course, public transit has costs—but those costs are far smaller. The total expense
of public transit in the United States was $30 billion in 2001. See 2006 Abstract, supra
note 46, at 449. By contrast, Americans spent over $800 billion on auto-related expenses. Id.
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 220.
See id. at 180–91. For example, some municipalities have sought to deter suburban
development by requiring ªve or ten acres per lot, thus causing suburban densities
to be even lower than they might otherwise have been. Id. at 190.
See id. at 188–89 (using growth controls in Boulder, Colorado as an example of regulation that, “[b]y reducing the supply of developable land[,] . . . drove up the price of
land and the cost of new housing.”)
Id. at 205 (describing Oregon planning scheme).
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agement measures started to have an effect.”155 A few pages earlier, however, he characterizes studies of the Oregon system’s effects upon prices
as a “bewildering duel of statistics”156 with “inconclusive”157 results.
Bruegmann’s relatively balanced treatment of growth controls, nevertheless, conceals an error of omission: regardless of the effects of Oregon’s
policies, it is certainly possible, in theory, to limit development in outer
suburbs without reducing the overall amount of buildable land. Suppose,
for example, that a state implements a system similar to Oregon’s but deregulates development inside the boundary. In such a situation, it is at
least possible that the amount of overall developable land in the region
might stay the same, thus avoiding massive increases in housing prices.158
Bruegmann also fails to adequately discuss the possibility of limiting
sprawl through more market-oriented, libertarian policies. The only such
policy that Bruegmann discusses in detail is the option of cutting government spending on sprawl-creating expressways—an option Bruegmann vigorously rejects. He asserts that inadequate road construction
“has led to a marked increase in congestion”159 while regions such as
Phoenix, Atlanta, and Houston are “building [their way] out of congestion.”160 In fact, however, congestion increased in all three areas between
1982 and 2003: from 17 hours per rush-hour traveler to 67 in Atlanta,161
from 39 hours to 63 in Houston,162 and from 18 hours to 49 in Phoenix.163
Bruegmann further asserts that Chicago has not built enough freeways to
accommodate trafªc,164 but two of the three regions he praises (Atlanta
and Houston) have more hours of delay per traveler than Chicago!165
155.
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Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 216.
Id. at 210.
Id.
See Levine, supra note 104, at 195–96 (suggesting that this may have happened in
Oregon to some extent). Cf. Garnett, supra note 14, at 10 (admitting that growth controls combined with selective deregulation may reduce housing prices in theory, but
adding that policymakers “may lack the political will to implement these tools on a
large enough scale to counter the regressive effects of growth management.”).
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 193 (“[N]ew road construction has lagged dramatically
behind roadway use, and this has led to a marked increase in congestion.”). Bruegmann’s reliance upon “roadway use,” however, (as opposed to population growth)
as a measure of “adequate” road construction leads to absurd results. For example,
suppose Sprawl City has no public transit or sidewalks, experiences 5% population
growth per decade, and increases its road network by 200% per decade. The new
roads create additional sprawl, causing people to live further from work and other
amenities which, in turn, causes vehicle miles traveled to increase by 300%. Although
Sprawl City has embarked on a gigantic road-building program and has refused to
support alternatives to driving, Bruegmann’s logic would lead one to conclude
Sprawl City policymakers are “anti-automobile.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 192
(asserting that “anti-automobile reformers” blocked some urban freeways).
Id. at 253 n.25.
See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Atlanta, GA, available at http://
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/atlanta.pdf.
See Texas Trans. Inst., The Mobility Data for Houston, TX, available at http://
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/houston.pdf.
See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Phoenix, AZ, available at http://
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/phoenix.pdf.
See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 193.
See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Chicago, IL-IN, available at http://
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/chicago.pdf (Chicago has 58 hours
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In fact, the effects of road-building upon congestion are anything but
certain. Perversely, road-building may make some places more congested
because of the phenomenon of “induced trafªc.”166 If a road makes suburb
X more popular to commuters and employers,167 that suburb will attract
more development, which means roads going to and from suburb X will
inevitably be more crowded.168
Moreover, Bruegmann’s focus on regulation and transportation overlooks the possibility that sprawl can be limited by reducing, rather than
by increasing, land use regulation—in particular, by thinning out the web
of zoning, parking and street design regulations that make American suburbs so automobile-dependent. A libertarian, anti-sprawl legal reform package would:
* Allow landowners to mix commercial and residential uses more
frequently so that more Americans could live within walking distance of shops and jobs.169
* Allow the market, rather than zoning laws, to govern population density.170 If landowners could build compact neighborhoods
without government interference, more people could live within
walking distance of commercial areas or transit stops.171
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of delay per traveler); see also supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text (Atlanta
has 67 hours of delay per traveler; Houston has 63).
Public debate over this proposition has led to “a bewildering duel of statistics [with]
inconclusive [results].” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 210 (using these phrases to describe debate over effects of Oregon planning policies upon housing prices). See Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, Road Building Has Little Effect on Congestion,
available at http://transact.org/report.asp?id=88 (suggesting that regions that most
rapidly expanded road network experienced increased congestion to same extent as
regions that had built fewer roads). But see contra Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 284
n.29 (citing studies to contrary).
Indeed, roads often make a given suburb more popular. See supra note 63.
Bruegmann asserts that “induced trafªc” is comprised of people “switching from
one route or means of transportation to a faster and more direct one” and thus does
not increase overall travel. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 131. This may be true where
the highway does not affect where people live—for example, a road between two already-developed areas that merely duplicates an existing road. Not all roads, however, necessarily meet these narrow criteria. Cf. Neal Peirce, Highway Builders Rev Up
For New Wave of Beltways, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Oct. 9, 1995, at B7, available
at 1995 WNLR 1001416 (suggesting that a new road near Chicago “will open up large
new areas of inexpensive farmland for development”).
See Garnett, supra note 33, at 21 (stating that existing zoning creates “spatial separation of land uses”); at 32 (zoning laws could be amended to allow mixed-use neighborhoods “where homes are situated within walking distance of stores, restaurants and
parks.”).
See Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 St. Louis U. Pub.
L. Rev. 253, 253 (2002) (“[H]allmarks of American land use law [include] reducing
population density and dispersing residents over wider areas”).
See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and Urban Sprawl, 30 Urb. Law.
547, 552 n.18 (1998) (explaining that, in low-density areas, transit use is rare because
“commuters are required to travel too far to transit stations”); see also Duany & Talen,
supra note 98, at 1448 (explaining that in a pedestrian-oriented neighborhood, residences should be within ¼ mile of other destinations); Ewing, supra note 90, at 2–3
(discussing positive effects of higher density in more detail).
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* Abolish setback and minimum parking requirements that require owners of apartment buildings, ofªces and stores to place
buildings far from streets and to surround those buildings with
parking lots.172 If landowners had the right to substitute houses
and shops for parking lots and to bring buildings closer to streets,
they could create more compact, pedestrian-friendly places by
placing more buildings on a parcel. In turn, this would make pedestrian commutes shorter and more pleasant by eliminating the
seas of parking that separate shops, ofªces and other destinations
from each other.173
* Amend municipal subdivision regulations that require the construction of wide streets.174 Wide streets take more time for pedestrians to cross and thus discourage walking both by lengthening a
pedestrian’s commute and by increasing the amount of time the
pedestrian is exposed to trafªc.175
* Allow more on-street parking.176 On-street parking creates a buffer
between pedestrians and fast-moving cars, thus making walking
more appealing.177
Unlike growth controls, some of these reforms might actually expand
housing supply; land that is currently used for parking or streets could be
used for additional housing. Unlike regulation-oriented policies, moreover, these reforms would actually expand consumer choice by reducing
government regulation of land use. Thus, it is possible to increase the
number of compact, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods without making
government more intrusive or increasing housing prices. It follows that,
because Bruegmann gives short shift to such deregulatory anti-sprawl
reforms,178 his analysis of remedies for sprawl is incomplete.
172. See Donald C. Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking 22, 25 (2005) (providing that
off-street parking requirements are so common as to be one of “three basic sets of
regulations” that are virtually universal). See also Duany & Talen, supra note 98, at
1449 (ªnding setback requirements also common); James Howard Kunstler, Home
From Nowhere 138 (1996) (showing that setback laws generally “keep buildings far
away from the street in order to create parking lots all around the building.”).
173. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 Va. Envtl. L.J. 247, 261 n.49 (2000) (stating that minimum parking requirements reduce density by “lead[ing] to the consumption of enormous amounts of land” for parking); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart
Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, 29 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 1529, 1534 (2002) (stating that minimum parking requirements make stores and
ofªce buildings less accessible to pedestrians and bicyclists by creating “huge expanses of asphalt” between those buildings in the form of parking lots, thus increasing distance between buildings and lengthening commutes).
174. See Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will The Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth
Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 101, 111 (2000) (“[M]unicipal
subdivision regulations commonly require overly wide streets”).
175. See Donovan v. Jones, 658 So. 2d 755, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] wider roadway
takes longer to cross thus increasing the time the pedestrian is exposed to trafªc”);
see also Freilich, supra note 171, at 557.
176. Cf. Lewyn, supra note 30, at 334 (noting that cities often limit on-street parking).
177. See Jeremy Meredith, Sprawl And The New Urbanist Solution, 89 Va. L. Rev. 447, 481
(2003).
178. With the exception of his assertion early in his book that, because some places have
become more dense, zoning may have “changed as necessary to accommodate mar-
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E. Myth Five: Only Elitists Oppose Sprawl
Bruegmann repeatedly asserts that sprawl is what ordinary middleclass people want while “elites” dare to question this trend. For example,
he claims that, in the 1920s, the creation of suburbs in Britain “led to a
violent reaction among members of Britain’s literary and artistic elite.”179
He asserts that, in recent decades, “upper-middle-class residents of central cities”180 engaged in an “assault on urban freeways”181 only when “the
automobile ceased to be a luxury item for the afºuent and came into the
hands of a large middle class.”182 Bruegmann similarly writes that, today,
“the anti-sprawl movement has been heavily supported by individuals
drawn from an upper-middle class professional population . . . an elite
group of academics, central-city business leaders, and employees of notfor-proªt organizations.”183 This “elite” believes that “[s]prawl is where
other people live, particularly people with less taste and good sense than
themselves. Much anti-sprawl activism is based on a desire to reform these
other people’s lives.”184 Bruegmann further suggests that New Urbanism
(a movement of architects who seek to design more mixed-use neighborhoods) is “only the latest version of a long-standing desire by cultural elites to manage middle-class urban life.”185
All of these remarks are basically “ad hominem” attacks—that is, they
target people making anti-sprawl arguments rather than the arguments
themselves.186 This sort of argument is logically fallacious, however, because even “elites” are sometimes right.
Moreover, it is simply not the case that only “elites” are concerned
about sprawl. This theory is implicitly rebutted by Bruegmann’s own
statement that “[w]hen asked, most Americans familiar with the term declare themselves against sprawl just as they say they are against pollution
or the destruction of historic buildings.”187 If “most Americans” are in
some sense against sprawl, opponents of sprawl are hardly an “elite.”
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ket realities.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 106. This statement, as noted above, overlooks the possibility that not every attempt to rezone property is successful. See supra
notes 104–113 and accompanying text.
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 117.
Id. at 130.
Id. His discussion of people who were actually “assaulted” by freeways is far more
clinical. He admits that freeways “displaced vast numbers of families.” Id. However,
he treats these displacements as mere “bad side effects” of policies that “clearly did
help enormously with urban congestion.” Id. See also supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text (discussing freeway-related displacement in more detail).
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 130.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 259 n.40 (asserting that another author “persuasively argues” as much).
See supra note 117 (describing fallacy).
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 161. See also Jennifer Frericks, A Regional Government For
Fragmented St. Louis: Even The “Favored Quarter” Would Beneªt, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 361,
362 n.9 (2005) (citing poll data; for example, one survey found that 78% of Americans
favored policies to curb sprawl); Anonymous, Community Designs Deter Physical Activity, Nation’s Health, June 1, 2003, at 18, available at 2003 WLNR 6757240 (showing most American adults favor a variety of policies designed to make streets more
walkable; for example, 70% favored increasing federal spending on pedestrian facilities, 55% would rather walk more than drive more, and almost half favored design-

Book Reviewg 105
Bruegmann also writes that “stopping or slowing the growth of new
development and sprawl often provides great material advantage to existing residents”188 by reducing the number of new cars on the roads that
suburbanites use and increasing home values by limiting the supply of
developable land.189 Since most Americans drive cars190 (and thus may
want less trafªc) and own homes191 (and thus may want increasing housing prices), it logically follows that most Americans have selªsh reasons
to oppose new suburban development. Americans who do not own cars,
moreover, have even stronger motives to oppose sprawl: where jobs move
to automobile-dependent suburbs, carless Americans are frozen out of
those jobs.192 Therefore, if both Americans with and without cars have reason to be concerned about sprawl, nearly all Americans are part of
Bruegmann’s so-called “anti-sprawl elite.”
Indeed, Bruegmann’s populist rhetoric could just as easily be turned
against sprawl because the United States has a powerful pro-sprawl “elite”:
the road-building lobby.193 A wide variety of corporate interests, including
automobile manufacturers, tire manufacturers, cement manufacturers, car
dealers, truckers,194 general contractors, and homebuilders,195 lobby Congress to spend more money on highways196 (although federal spending on
highways already exceeds transit spending by about a 5-1 margin).197 This
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ing communities so that houses and shops were closer together, even if houses
would be closer together).
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 162.
Id.
See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 637 (showing that only 9 million of nation’s 105.8
million occupied housing units had no car).
See Alphonso R. Jackson, Rising Housing Costs Are A National Concern, 12 Fall J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 1 (2002) (stating that about 68% of Americans own
homes).
See Mann, supra note 4, at 607 (noting that most suburban jobs are not accessible
through public transit). Indeed, it could be argued that because carless Americans are
disproportionately poor, Bruegmann’s support of automobile-oriented development
could itself be described as “elitist.” See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 & n.61 (showing that most welfare recipients do not own cars).
As well as the less powerful aesthetic elite that Bruegmann cites in favor of his
views. He devotes two pages of his book in a section headed “The Avant-Garde Discovers Sprawl” to a listing of the avant-garde architects who, in his words, seek “to
describe and understand the aesthetics of sprawl.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 153–
54.
See American Highway Users Alliance, The Open Road 9, available at
http://www.highways.org/pdfs/2006action-plan.pdf (visited June 13, 2006) (showing that all of these industries represented on board of American Highway Users Alliance, a group that lobbies for increased road funding).
See U.S. Pirg, Driven By Dollars 6, available at http://www.uspirg.org/reports/
DrivenbyDollars.pdf (noting that general contractors and homebuilders also part of
road lobby).
Id. at 10–11.
2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 709 (showing that in 2003, federal budget included
just over $97 billion in outlays for highway trust fund and just under $20 billion for
Federal Transit Administration grants). Bruegmann argues that this gap is hardly inequitable because highway ridership is much higher than transit ridership. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 146. Building highways based on low transit ridership creates
a self-fulªlling prophecy: if government provides lots of highways and scarce transit
service, of course more people will use the highways. See Transp. Data, supra note
129 (“Only 4 percent of the nation’s 4 million miles of roads are now served by tran-
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elite gives vast amounts of money to politicians. For example, general
contractors gave over $10 million to 81 Senators and 401 Congresspeople
in 2004,198 car dealers gave $4.6 million,199 and automobile manufacturers
gave $1.5 million.200 Bruegmann, however, does not describe automobile
manufacturers or general contractors as “elites,” even though these corporations may well have more money and power than the academics,
downtown businesses, and not-for-proªt employees who Bruegmann describes as “elites.”201
If Bruegmann is trying to argue that only elites oppose sprawl, he is
wrong because most Americans favor some limits on suburban sprawl. If
Bruegmann is trying to argue that all elites oppose sprawl, he is equally
wrong because the United States has pro-sprawl elites aplenty. Either
way, Bruegmann’s populist posing adds more heat than light to the debate over suburban development.
III. Conclusion
Bruegmann’s book is less important in and of itself than it is as an example of some common misconceptions about sprawl: the notion that the
status quo is inevitable, the denial of government complicity, and the denial of sprawl’s more unpleasant consequences.
Bruegmann claims that sprawl exists in every afºuent society—but
there is a world of difference between a region like New York City, where
an automobile-centered life is one lifestyle choice among many, and a city
like Oklahoma City, in which almost every adult needs a car to live a
normal life. Bruegmann claims that sprawl is a result of the free market at
work—but, in fact, government-built highways fragment development
across the landscape, and government-enforced zoning, parking and
street design regulations impede the creation of alternatives to sprawl.
Bruegmann claims that sprawl expands consumer choice—but, in its most
extreme forms, sprawl actually limits consumer choices by making the
automobile the only feasible mode of transportation in many places.
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sit.”). By contrast, if government shifted resources to transit, transit ridership might
continue to rise. Cf. supra note 46 and accompanying text (showing that transit ridership rose in recent years).
Ctr. for Responsive Pols., General Contractors: Money to Congress, available
at http://opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?Ind=C01&cycle=2004.
Ctr. For Responsive Pols., Car Dealers: Money to Congress, available at http://
opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?Ind=T2300&recipdetail=A&sortorder=U&
Cycle =2004.
Ctr. For Responsive Pols., Auto Manufacturers: Money to Congress, available at
http://opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?cycle=2004&ind=T2100.
See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 163 (describing these groups as components of antisprawl “elite.”).

